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Pooling and Unpooling in the Uber Economy
Daniel J. Hemel†

In August 2014, the online transportation network Uber launched
a new service named “UberPool,” which allows Uber users to share the
cost of a car ride with strangers traveling along a similar route.1 In a
blog post announcing UberPool, the company hailed the new service as
“a bold social experiment” bringing the company and its customers into
a “brave new world” of ridesharing.2 The blog post added that “the larger
social implications of reducing the number of cars on the road,
congestion in cities, pollution, [and] parking challenges” are “truly
inspiring.”3 In the two years after the August 2014 launch, more than
100 million UberPool rides were recorded, and UberPool came to
account for approximately 20% of Uber trips.4 In that respect, Uber’s
“bold social experiment” in pooling was a resounding success.5
While Uber has successfully facilitated pooling among its millions
of customers, it has done little to facilitate a different kind of pooling—
the pooling of risk—among the 400,000-plus drivers who compose its
workforce.6 This article focuses on the pooling of five types of risk among
workers: health risk, longevity risk, mortality risk, disability risk, and
productivity risk. Millions of employees participate in workplace-based
pooling arrangements that serve to insure them against risks of these
types. Platforms such as Uber, however, have thus far failed to provide
the same sort of pooling benefits to the workers on whose labor they rely
This article examines the present state of workplace-based risk
pooling in the age of Uber. Part I explains the basic problem of adverse
†

Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School; dhemel@uchicago.edu.
Announcing UberPool, UBER NEWSROOM (Aug. 5, 2014), https://newsroom.uber.com/an
nouncing-uberpool [https://perma.cc/WHZ2-9SYV].
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
Get Ready to Share: UberPOOL Launches in Singapore, UBER NEWSROOM (June 29, 2016),
https://newsroom.uber.com/singapore/get-ready-to-share-uberpool-launches-in-singapore [https://
perma.cc/L9LM-GBSF].
5
UBER NEWSROOM, supra note 1.
6
For the 400,000 driver figure, see New Survey: Drivers Choose Uber for Its Flexibility and
Convenience, UBER NEWSROOM (Dec. 7, 2015), https://newsroom.uber.com/driver-partner-survey
[https://perma.cc/3T3A-FKXL].
1
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selection in individual insurance markets. Mandatory pooling can
mitigate adverse selection problems, though at the same time it gives
rise to the related problem of moral hazard (i.e., the reduced incentive
to guard against risk when one is shielded from the consequences). Part
II describes the ways in which workplaces have served to pool particular
risks, and then goes on to highlight the advantages and disadvantages
of workplace-based risk pooling as against individual insurance
markets. Part III provides an overview of economy-wide trends: while
Uber and similar online platforms have contributed to “unpooling” (i.e.,
the individualization of risk) in specific sectors, a bird’s-eye view of the
labor market makes clear that workplace-based risk pooling has always
left a significant segment of the U.S. population unpooled. Part IV
considers possible private-sector and public-sector responses to the
problems that unpooling poses.
I.

ADVERSE SELECTION IN INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE MARKETS

The problem of adverse selection in individual insurance markets
is explained most easily by way of example. Imagine a population with
two groups of equal sizes: the Eggshells and the Hardrocks. Let’s say
that the Eggshells have expected accident costs of $50 and the
Hardrocks have expected accident costs of $30. (We could replace
accident costs with any other conceivably insurable expenses:
healthcare costs, disability costs, etc.). Both the Eggshells and the
Hardrocks are risk averse, and so both assign a higher value to
insurance than their expected accident costs. To keep the math simple,
we’ll assume that the value of insurance to any individual is 120% times
expected accident costs, so the Eggshells would pay $60 for a policy that
provides full coverage and the Hardrocks would pay $36 for the same
policy. Assume for now that individuals know whether they are
Eggshells or Hardrocks, but insurers either practically or legally cannot
distinguish between the two types.
What will happen if insurers offer full coverage policies at cost (i.e.,
no profit margin)? If the insurer can sell to Eggshells and Hardrocks in
equal numbers, then the insurer might initially set the premium at $40
(the average expected cost for members of the population). The
Eggshells will purchase insurance because $60 > $40; the Hardrocks
will not because $36 < $40. If all the Hardrocks drop out of the market,
the insurer’s average expected cost for customers in the risk pool will be
$50. Assuming no profit margin, insurers will then set premiums at
$50; Eggshells will pay; and Hardrocks will not. A separating
equilibrium emerges: even though individual riskiness is unobservable,
the premium causes Eggshells and Hardrocks to divide themselves into
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different groups, with the Eggshells purchasing insurance and the
Hardrocks not.
To appreciate the social costs of adverse selection, compare this
separating equilibrium to a scenario in which Eggshells and Hardrocks
remain in the same risk pool. If there are 50 Eggshells and 50
Hardrocks, the social surplus (benefit minus cost) from insuring all 100
individuals is equal to 50 x ($60 - $50) + 50 x ($36 - $30) = $800. In the
separating equilibrium, only the Eggshells acquire insurance, and the
social surplus is 50 x ($60 - $50) = $500.
The example above is intended to show that a single risk pool
encompassing Eggshells and Hardrocks can increase social welfare.
One might also argue on distributional grounds that pooling is
preferable to separating: behind the veil of ignorance, before we know
whether we are Eggshells or Hardrocks, we would want to insure
against the risk of being an Eggshell. Adverse selection raises the cost
of premiums for the Eggshells, and thus increases the downside of
losing the natural lottery.7
We might imagine further iterations involving a menu of insurance
contracts rather than a binary choice between full insurance and no
insurance. A rich literature in economics explores the range of possible
outcomes when insurance contracts of varying generosity are offered
under conditions of asymmetric information.8 The conclusions of that
literature defy easy summary, but a fair generalization is that
individuals often go with suboptimal amounts of insurance absent some
sort of subsidy.9
The running example of the Eggshells and Hardrocks can serve to
illustrate the efficiency of a subsidy. With a subsidy of any more than
$4, Hardrocks will return to the insurance market. If all 50 Eggshells
and all 50 Hardrocks purchase insurance, then the average cost to the
insurer will be $40; the value of full coverage to Hardrocks is still $36;
and the insurance offer plus subsidy is now attractive to the Hardrocks.
Eggshells, of course, will remain in the market just as before. Another
way to achieve the same objective might be to impose an insurance
mandate: Eggshells and Hardrocks alike could be required to acquire

7

See David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, in 1
FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH 1, 9–10 (Alan M. Garber ed., 1998).
8
The seminal paper on the subject is Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J.
ECON. 629 (1976) [hereinafter Equilbrium]. For a more recent analysis by the same authors, see
Michael Rothschild & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Competition and Insurance Twenty Years Later, 22
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. THEORY 73 (1997).
9
See Equilibrium, supra note 8, at 644.

11 HEMEL PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

268

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

12/17/17 8:33 PM

[2017

coverage. Subsidies and mandates are not mutually exclusive: the
Affordable Care Act is a familiar example of the two combined.
While mandatory risk pooling would increase overall welfare and
might be desirable on distributive justice grounds, it is not—at least in
this case—Pareto-efficient: it makes Eggshells better off but Hardrocks
worse off ($36 < $40). Note, moreover, that the example does not account
for the problem of moral hazard. If individuals have some control over
whether they become Eggshells or Hardrocks, then a single risk pool
with a uniform premium might promote inefficient behavior because
individuals incur less of a cost if they become Eggshells. So too, insured
individuals will have less of an incentive to reduce their risk, and so we
might expect a higher overall accident rate when all individuals are
fully insured than when only the Eggshells are insured.
For present purposes, the important points are (1) that under some
conditions, unsubsidized individual insurance markets will leave
significant segments of the population without coverage, and (2) that
forcing high-risk and low-risk individuals into the same pool can be
welfare-enhancing. The next section turns to ways in which workplacebased risk pools accomplish that function.
II. POOLING IN THE WORKPLACE
This part focuses on specific risks commonly pooled among
employees of a firm: health risk, longevity risk, mortality risk, disability
risk, and productivity risk. Several themes run throughout. First,
workplace-based risk pools benefit from government subsidies that are
often unavailable to participants in individual insurance markets.
Second, workplace-based risk pools sometimes (though not always)
mitigate adverse selection problems by pushing high-risk and low-risk
individuals into the same pools. Third, workplace-based risk pooling
takes advantage of the division of labor, with human resource
specialists aiding employees with enrollment and other insurance plan
interactions. Fourth and relatedly, workplace-based pooling
arrangements potentially reduce administrative costs through scale
economies. Fifth and finally, firms sometimes (though again, not
always) enjoy advantages over individual insurance providers in
managing moral hazard. These advantages of workplace-based risk
pooling are reflected in part by the high level of participation among
large-firm employees. But the advantages of workplace-based risk
pooling are not unqualified, and the analysis in this part notes some
ways in which workplace-based risk pooling may be problematic.
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Health Risk

The model of the Eggshells and the Hardrocks in Part I is perhaps
most applicable to the health insurance setting. The workplace serves
as a potential site for the pooling of health risks across high-risk and
low-risk individuals. First and foremost, federal income tax law
provides a strong incentive for employees—regardless of their health
status—to seek insurance through the workplace. An employer’s
contribution to a health plan for an employee or the employee’s spouse,
dependent, or child is excluded from gross income under section 106 of
the Internal Revenue Code.10 Section 106 effectively subsidizes
employer-provided health insurance in an amount equal to the product
of the employer’s excluded payment and the employee’s marginal tax
rate. To continue with the example from Part I of the Eggshells and the
Hardrocks, imagine that both groups face a marginal tax rate of 25%.
The Eggshells are indifferent between $80 in pre-tax wages and an
insurance policy providing benefits that they value at $60; the
Hardrocks are indifferent between $48 in pre-tax wages and an
insurance policy providing benefits that they value at $36. If the
employer gives employees the option of sacrificing $40 in pre-tax wages
in exchange for health insurance coverage with no deductibles or
copays, the Eggshells and the Hardrocks will both accept.
The Affordable Care Act gives a further incentive for employers to
offer health insurance to employees.11 The ACA added section 4980H to
the Internal Revenue Code, which imposes an annual penalty of $2,000
on employers with more than 50 full-time employees who fail to sponsor
health insurance through the workplace if at least one of those
employees enrolls in an ACA-subsidized plan.12 The combination of
carrot and stick—a subsidy for employer-sponsored health insurance
plans through section 106, and a penalty for failing to sponsor such a
10

26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2012); 26 C.F.R 1.106-1(a). Note that self-employed individuals and
individuals who are not eligible for employer-subsidized plans can claim an above-the-line income
tax deduction for health insurance as well. 26 U.S.C. § 162(l) (2012); cf. 26 U.S.C. § 401(c) (2012)
(defining “employee” for purposes of § 162(l) and other statutes to include self-employed
individuals). An employee who opts out of employer-subsidized coverage and instead chooses to
purchase insurance on the individual market would not be eligible for the deduction. Also,
employer contributions to employee health insurance are excluded from the payroll tax base, see
26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(2) (2012), whereas individuals (including self-employed individuals) who
purchase insurance on the individual market cannot deduct premiums for payroll tax purposes.
11
The American Health Care Act proposed by House Republican leaders in early March 2017
has the potential to reverse the incentive so that employees are better off in after-tax terms if their
employers do not offer health insurance. See Daniel Hemel, The House GOP Plan and EmployerSponsored Health Insurance: Killing It Softly?, WHATEVER SOURCE DERIVED (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2mRPCOt [http://perma.cc/H8RX-9JLH]; cf. American Health Care Reform Act of
2017, H.R. 277, 115th Cong. (2017).
12
26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012).
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plan under section 4980H13—has resulted in virtually all large
employers offering health insurance to employees. In one 2015 survey,
99% of large firms (50 employees or more) reported that they offer
health insurance to full-time employees.14
Beyond the subsidies for participation and the penalties for opting
out, there are at least four more reasons why employees might choose
to participate in workplace-based health risk pools rather than
acquiring health insurance on the individual market. First, adverse
selection may be less severe because employees match with employers
based on a number of factors other than health insurance. In the
individual market, we might expect to see high-risk individuals select
into (and low-risk individuals select out of ) generous health plans; we
might think it less likely that high-risk and low-risk individuals will
sort across workplaces based on the generosity of employee health
benefits. Second, many individuals lack the time or the background
knowledge to navigate a complex web of health insurance options;
delegating decisionmaking to a human resource specialist can serve as
a way to pool cognitive costs.15 Third, costs for sales, marketing, brokers’
fees, and other administrative expenses are significantly lower in the
large-employer market than in the individual market: unsurprisingly,
the cost incurred by an insurer in selling a policy to a 50-employee firm
is well below the cost of selling individual policies to each of the 50
employees.16 Fourth, and finally, we might expect that employers, who
already observe employees on a regular basis, enjoy an absolute
13

The Affordable Care Act applied a similar carrot-and-stick approach to support the
individual health insurance market. For the carrots, the ACA provides subsidies to help low- and
moderate-income households purchase insurance on the individual market, see 26 U.S.C. § 36B
(2012), as well as subsidies for insurers that cover low- and moderate-income households, see 42
U.S.C. § 18071 (2012). For the stick, the ACA’s individual mandate imposes a requirement to
maintain minimum health insurance coverage, with a penalty for noncompliance of $695 or 2.5%
of income (whichever is greater). See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). Early evidence suggests that
adverse selection has remained a significant problem in the individual health insurance market
notwithstanding the ACA’s positive and negative incentives for health individuals to enroll. See
Newly Enrolled Members in the Individual Health Insurance Market After Health Care Reform:
The Experience from 2014 and 2015, BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD (Mar. 20, 2016), https://
www.bcbs.com/about-us/capabilities-initiatives/health-america/health-of-america-report/newlyenrolled-members [https://perma.cc/32MP-UYDH]; see also Matthew Panhans, Adverse Selection
in ACA Exchange Markets: Evidence from Colorado (Dec. 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920049 [https://perma.cc/6TG2-TWA3].
14
TRANSAMERICA CTR. FOR HEALTH STUDIES, TRANSAMERICA CENTER FOR HEALTH STUDIES
SURVEY: COMPANIES NAVIGATE THE HEALTH COVERAGE MANDATE 11 (Dec. 2015).
15
On the inability of individuals to make rational health insurance choices, see Saurabh
Bhargava et al., Do Individuals Make Sensible Health Insurance Decisions? Evidence from a Menu
with Dominated Options (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 21160, May 2015),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21160 [https://perma.cc/N7HF-NG4H].
16
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND FEDERAL POLICY
36 tbl.A-1 (Feb. 2016).
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advantage vis-à-vis insurers when it comes to managing moral
hazard.17
Before concluding that all is well with workplace-based health risk
pooling, four caveats are in order. First, the 99% figure for full-time
employees at large firms does not mean that all workers have the option
of enrolling in health insurance through their workplace: coverage rates
are considerably lower for part-time employees and employees of
smaller firms.18 Second, a rapidly rising percentage of covered workers
are enrolled in plans with an annual deductible of $1,000 or more.19 In
many cases, workers with employer-sponsored health insurance are
receiving less comprehensive coverage than they were a few years ago
(though whether the spread of high-deductible policies increases or
decreases welfare is difficult to determine).20 Third, most employers
that sponsor health insurance for their employees offer a choice among
multiple plans.21 While more choice might sound like an unmitigated
good, such choice can also reproduce the adverse selection problem at
the workplace level: employees who know they are sick opt into the
more generous plans; employees who know they are healthy opt into the
less expensive, high deductible plans; and the separation that might be
anticipated in the individual market is replicated in the large group
market.22 Fourth and finally, workplace-based pooling of health risk
may lead to “job lock,” with workers failing to make productivity-

17

The experience thus far with workplace-based wellness programs, however, has not given
us much reason to believe that employer interventions can significantly improve employee health.
See SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., RAND INST., WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY FINAL REPORT
(2013), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR254.readonline.html [https://perma.cc/YK
9J-D9SD].
18
The Transamerica survey reports that 30% of firms with 500 or more employees offer health
insurance to part-time employees; that figure drops to 26% for firms with 50 to 499 employees and
8% for firms with fewer than 50 employees. Meanwhile, 61% of firms with fewer than 50 employees
report that they offer health insurance to full-time employees. See TRANSAMERICA CTR. FOR
HEALTH STUDIES, supra note 14.
19
In 2006, 10% of covered workers were enrolled in these high deductible plans. By 2015, the
figure had increased to 46%. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL
TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2015 ANNUAL SURVEY 5 (2015), http://files.kff.org/
attachment/report-2015-employer-health-benefits-survey [https://perma.cc/A42M-Z7T4].
20
The literature on the welfare effects of insurance deductibles is voluminous. One seminal
contribution is Kenneth J. Arrow, Optimal Insurance and Generalized Deductibles, 1974 SCAND.
ACTUARIAL J. 1.
21
According to a 2015 survey by the Federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality,
approximately 50.2% of private-sector firms that sponsor health insurance for their employees
offer two or more plan options. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, MEDICAL
EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY tbl.I.A.2.d (2015), https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/
insr/national/series_1/2015/tia2d.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RUW-RTDB].
22
For a case study illustrating the phenomenon of within-firm adverse selection among
Harvard University employees, see David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, Paying for Health
Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Competition and Adverse Selection, 113 Q.J. ECON. 433 (1998).

11 HEMEL PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

272

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

12/17/17 8:33 PM

[2017

improving job switches because they are worried about leaving their
existing health insurance plans and provider networks.23
To sum up so far: workplaces have emerged as the primary sites for
the pooling of health risks outside of Medicare and Medicaid. This fact
can be attributed to tax incentives for employer-sponsored health
insurance, penalties under the Affordable Care Act for large employers
that fail to provide coverage, and certain structural features that make
it generally easier and cheaper for workers to procure health insurance
coverage through their employers rather than on the individual market.
But millions of Americans have been left outside workplace-based
health risk pools, and workplace-based health risk pooling carries social
costs as well as benefits.
B.

Longevity Risk

The notion of insuring against the risk of longevity might seem
strange on first glance, since most of us think of long life as a blessing
than a risk.24 But the risk of outliving one’s savings is a real one—and
one that it is difficult to insure against on the individual market. In
theory, individuals can insure against longevity risk by purchasing
annuities that guarantee monthly payments for the rest of their lives.
In practice, however, the same adverse selection problems that we
might expect to see in the individual health insurance market plague
the annuity market as well.25 Here, the roles of the Eggshells and the
Hardrocks are reversed: it is the healthy, long-lived individuals who are
costlier to insure, and the frailer, shorter-lived individuals who drop out
of the market.
In an insightful 1990 paper, Zvi Bodie argued that “[e]mployer
pension plans offer a way of overcoming the adverse selection problem”
in the annuity market.26 Employers can accomplish this, according to
Bodie, “[b]y making participation in the plan mandatory and offering
life annuities as the only payout option.”27 At the time of Bodie’s article,
“defined benefit” pension plans, which approximate employer-provided
annuities, were the most common arrangement among U.S. employees
23

On employer-based health insurance and job lock, see Jonathan Gruber, Health Insurance
and the Labor Market, 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 645, 654–58 (A.J. Cuyler & J.P.
Newhouse eds., 2000).
24
But see NATALIE BABBITT, TUCK EVERLASTING (1975).
25
See Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets:
Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market, 112 J. POL. ECON. 183 (2004); see generally
Benjamin M. Friedman & Mark J. Warshawsky, The Cost of Annuities: Implications for Saving
Behavior and Bequests, 105 Q.J. ECON. 135 (1990).
26
Zvi Bodie, Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 28, 35 (1990).
27
Id.
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covered by workplace-based pension plans.28 By requiring employees to
participate in such plans, employers could ensure that the longevity
risk pool remained representative of the workforce as a whole rather
than being dominated by longer lived (and thus costlier-to-insure)
individuals.
Over the last three and a half decades, however, we have witnessed
a dramatic decline in defined benefit pension plan participation and a
corresponding shift toward defined contribution plans.29 The causes of
this shift are complicated. Legal and regulatory changes no doubt
played an important role. The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA)30 and the Revenue Act of 197831 created individual
retirement arrangements (IRAs) and defined contribution 401(k) plans,
respectively; these vehicles allow workers to gain the advantage of tax
deferral without participating in a defined benefit plan.32 But while the
emergence of IRAs and defined contribution 401(k) plans may have
been a necessary condition for the shift, the availability of these
alternatives was not a sufficient condition: the tax deferral advantages
of IRAs and defined contribution 401(k) plans are in some cases similar
to—and in other cases less generous than—the tax deferral advantages
of defined benefit pension plans.33

28

See id. at 30 n.5 (citing TRENDS IN PENSIONS tbl.4.6 (John A. Turner & Daniel J. Beller eds.,
1989)).
29
For an overview, see James M. Poterba et al., The Decline of Defined Benefit Retirement
Plans and Asset Flows, in SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 333 (Jeffrey
Brown et al. eds., 2009).
30
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
31
Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
32
26 U.S.C. § 408 (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2012).
33
In a defined benefit plan, the employer makes annual contributions such that the plan can
meet its defined benefit obligations, given certain actuarial assumptions. For 2017, the maximum
benefit is the lesser of (a) 100% of the participant’s average compensation for her highest three
consecutive calendar years, or (b) $215,000 (with the latter amount to be adjusted in future years
for changes in the cost of living). See 26 U.S.C. § 415(b) (2012); Retirement Topics—Defined Benefit
Plan Benefit Limits, IRS (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participantemployee/retirement-topics-defined-benefit-plan-benefit-limits [https://perma.cc/S6VL-LF65].
For workers with high peak-year compensation, the allowable contribution to a defined
benefit plan will likely exceed the $18,000 cap for defined contribution 401(k) plans (or $24,000 for
workers 50 and over making catch-up contributions). See Retirement Topics - 401(k) and ProfitSharing Plan Contribution Limits, IRS (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/planparticipant-employee/retirement-topics-401k-and-profit-sharing-plan-contribution-limits [https://
perma.cc/HGF7-ZVGA]; see generally Paul Sullivan, Save for Retirement in Just 10 Years? It’s
Doable, But Risky, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/your-money/
defined-benefit-plans-allow-fast-retirement-saving-but-with-risks.html [https://perma.cc/NB9VWL7A] (noting that the allowable contribution to a defined benefit plan for a highly compensated
worker in her 50s could potentially exceed $250,000 a year). For a younger, lower-wage worker,
the defined contribution 401(k) cap may be higher than the defined benefit cap.
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Edward Zelinsky notes several additional changes in the legal
landscape that may have accelerated the shift away from defined
benefit plans.34 Among others: ERISA imposed intricate “minimum
funding” rules that applied to sponsors of defined benefit but not defined
contribution plans,35 and imposed federal fiduciary standards on
employers that are easier to satisfy with respect to defined contribution
plans than defined benefit plans.36 Broader labor market trends,
including the decline of unions and increasing employee mobility, may
have reinforced ERISA’s effects.37
Whatever the causes, the consequences of the shift away from
defined benefit pensions and toward a “defined contribution paradigm”
are stark. The share of private sector workers participating in defined
benefit plans has fallen from 38% in 1979 to 13% in 2013, while the
share participating in defined contribution plans has risen from 17% to
44%.38 While the share of private sector workers covered by any
employee pension plan has remained relatively constant over that
period (45% in 1979, 46% in 2013),39 the extent to which workplaces
serve as sites of longevity risk pooling has decreased drastically.
C.

Mortality Risk

The flip side of longevity risk (the risk of outliving one’s retirement
savings) is mortality risk (the risk of dying before retirement). A
breadwinner’s death during peak earning years results in a negative
shock to household income. A worker who wants to guarantee a smooth
consumption path for her spouse, children, or other dependents may
therefore want to acquire insurance against mortality risk (i.e., life
insurance).
One might expect to see adverse selection in the individual life
insurance market just as one sees adverse selection in the individual
annuity market. If individuals who expect to live shorter lives select out
of the annuity market, then those same individuals will select into the
life insurance market—or so we might anticipate. Consistent with this
expectation, Daifeng He finds that individuals who purchase life

34

See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 471–81
(2004).
35
See 26 U.S.C. § 412 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081–1086 (2012); Zelinsky, supra note 34, at 475.
36
See Zelinsky, supra note 34, at 478–79.
37
Id. at 480–81.
38
FAQs About Benefits—Retirement Issues, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., https://
www.ebri.org/publications/benfaq/index.cfm?fa=retfaq14 [https://perma.cc/YKQ7-V2D4] (last visited Dec. 22, 2016).
39
Id.
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insurance in the United States die sooner than the general population
after controlling for variables that are generally observable to insurers
(specifically, age, gender, smoking status, health status, medical
history, and family history).40 The results of He’s study suggest that
individuals with private information about their own life expectancy
select into and out of life insurance on the basis of that information.41
While adverse selection problems place limits on the pooling of
mortality risk in the individual life insurance market, quite a bit of
mortality risk pooling occurs in the workplace. In 2013, group life
insurance accounted for approximately 32% of total death payments by
U.S. life insurers42 and 42% of all life insurance in the United States by
face amount,43 though less than 21% of net premium receipts.44 Not all
group life insurance is employer-based: some unions and professional
associations offer group life insurance as well.45 Overall, though,
employer-based group life insurance is quite common, with
approximately 72% of full-time workers in the United States having
access to life insurance through their employers in 2014 and 71%
participating in employer-based life insurance.46
Federal tax law strongly incentivizes employers to provide term life
insurance coverage of up to $50,000 for employees; employer-paid
premiums up to that coverage cap are excluded from the employee’s
gross income for federal income tax and payroll tax purposes.47 (Note
that life insurance death benefits are also excluded from income under
section 101.48) In dollar terms, the tax expenditure for employerprovided group term life insurance is tiny in comparison to the
expenditure for employer-sponsored health insurance,49 but the
economics are similar: in both cases, federal tax law effectively
subsidizes workplace-based risk pooling such that even low-risk
workers find it worthwhile to participate.
40

Daifeng He, The Life Insurance Market: Asymmetric Information Revisited, 93 J. PUB. ECON.
1090, 1093–95 (2009).
41
Id. at 1095.
42
AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, 2014 LIFE INSURERS FACTBOOK 47 (2014).
43
Id. at 66 tbl.7.1.
44
Id. at 38 tbl.4.3.
45
Id. at 65.
46
GEN RE, LIFE & HEALTH FACT BOOK, 2015–2016, at 51 (2014). Among part-time workers,
13% had access to life insurance through their employers and 11% participated. Id.
47
26 U.S.C. § 79(a) (2012).
48
26 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
49
For the 2017 fiscal year, the Treasury Department estimates that the tax expenditure for
employer-sponsored health insurance will be $222 billion, compared to $2.58 billion for employerprovided group term life insurance. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, TAX
EXPENDITURES 34 tbl.3 (Sept. 28, 2016).
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D. Disability Risk
Disability risk might be considered a subspecies of health risk (see
Section II.A above) or productivity risk (see Section II.E below); it is, in
any event, a type of risk for which individual insurance markets are
vulnerable to adverse selection (as well as moral hazard). Perhaps
unsurprisingly, private disability insurance in the United States is
primarily procured through the group rather than individual market:
measured by premiums paid, group insurance accounted for more than
three-quarters of the U.S. disability insurance market in 2013.50
Coverage rates vary dramatically across sector, with participation
exceeding 50% among managerial and professional workers and below
20% among service sector workers. Overall, the share of full-time
workers participating in workplace-based disability insurance in 2013
was 48% for short-term disability coverage and 43% for long-term
disability coverage. The comparable figures for part-time workers were
13% (short-term) and 11% (long-term).51
Federal income tax law encourages employer-based disability
insurance, though not in a straightforward way. Employer-paid
disability insurance premiums are excludable from the employee’s gross
income, though with the consequence that future disability benefits are
fully taxable.52 However, disability is generally associated with a drop
in income, and so the disabled beneficiary’s marginal income tax rate at
the time of inclusion is likely lower than the employee’s marginal
income tax rate at the time of exclusion. In this respect, disability
insurance provided by an employer allows insured employees to shift
taxable income from higher bracket years to lower bracket years.
Thus, as in the cases of health risk and mortality risk, workplaces
serve as sites for the pooling of disability risk. As in the health and
mortality risk cases, this phenomenon may be partially attributable to
the advantage of workplace-based risk pooling as an antidote to adverse
selection: we might expect that workers will be less likely to match with
employers on the basis of disability risk than that they might select
among disability insurance policies on the individual market on the
basis of private information. And as in the health and mortality risk
cases, the prevalence of workplace-based disability risk pooling may be
partially attributable to incentives provided by the tax code. The key
50

GEN RE, LIFE & HEALTH FACT BOOK, 2015-2016, supra note 46, at 61–62.
Id. at 50–51.
52
See IRS, LIFE INSURANCE & DISABILITY INSURANCE PROCEEDS, https://www.irs.gov/helpresources/tools-faqs/faqs-for-individuals/frequently-asked-tax-questions-answers/interest-dividen
ds-other-types-of-income/life-insurance-disability-insurance-proceeds/life-insurance-disability-ins
urance-proceeds-1 [https://perma.cc/D8X8-5EK8] (last updated Jan. 1, 2016).
51
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point for present purposes is that workers who do not obtain disability
insurance through their employers are likely to encounter greater
obstacles (and higher costs) in trying to obtain such insurance on the
individual market.
E.

Productivity Risk

Productivity risk refers to the risk that a worker’s marginal product
of labor will drop unexpectedly. A worker may turn out to be less
productive than anticipated on a particular day because of a migraine
headache, or less productive for a week because of the flu, or less
productive for a year because of a time-consuming and distracting
divorce. She may find that her particular skill is less valuable because
of a macroeconomic swing (e.g., the bankruptcy lawyer in boom time, or
the mergers and acquisitions lawyer in a downturn). Or her particular
site might attract less traffic because of events beyond her control (e.g.,
the barista at a specific Starbucks location may see her productivity
decline when the metro stop next to her café closes temporarily for
renovation).
In some cases, the worker may be able to purchase insurance so
that negative shocks to her productivity do not affect her consumption.
(The mergers and acquisitions lawyer, for example, might short the
S&P 500.) In many other cases, however, such insurance will be
impossible to procure. Premiums may be prohibitively high on account
of moral hazard. For example, the worker may be less likely to get a flu
shot if she knows that she is protected against the negative productivity
shock from losing a week of work, and the insurer—knowing this as
well—will be less willing to provide coverage unless at a steeper price.
Adverse selection may push premiums higher still. For example,
workers who know that they are migraine-prone will be more likely to
buy headache insurance; insurers, knowing that, will raise their prices;
only the most migraine-prone workers will be willing to insure at the
higher price; and so on.
Firms enjoy two significant advantages over individual insurance
markets with regard to productivity risk pooling across workers. First,
managers monitor workers who are in close proximity (and co-workers
in close proximity monitor each other). In theory, an insurer providing
productivity insurance to a particular worker could try to police
shirking via site visits and video monitoring, but the manager has
obvious advantages over the insurer (e.g., greater familiarity with the
requirements of the job and the factors that might influence
productivity, and scale-economy and specialization advantages from
monitoring all of the workers at a specific site rather than a small
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number of workers at one site and a small number at another).53
Second, workplace-based productivity risk pools might be less
vulnerable to adverse selection than an individual insurance market
would be. I might accept a job when I think that I will underperform
expectations and earn a wage that exceeds the marginal product of my
labor,54 but I also might accept a job when I think that I will outperform
expectations and rise through the firm’s ranks.
Workplaces are sites at which workers pool productivity risk. The
criterion for productivity risk pooling is that compensation varies less
than the marginal product of labor. This generally will be true when
workers receive a fixed wage or salary (even when they also earn
commissions, tips, or bonuses). It may also be true when workers are
compensated on the basis of firm-level profitability rather than
personal performance (e.g., partners at a law firm with a lock-step
compensation structure).55
Federal tax law encourages the pooling of productivity risk across
workers. The federal income tax code is progressive: rates rise as
taxable income increases. This feature of the tax code generates an
incentive for workers to smooth income across years. For example,
Person A, an unmarried individual with taxable income of $100,000 one
year and $100,000 the next, will pay less in federal income taxes than
Person B, an unmarried individual with taxable income of $120,000 one
year and $80,000 the next.56 Note that even if Person B could purchase
productivity insurance on the individual market, she would still bear a
tax cost from income volatility.57
Note also that even when workplaces facilitate the pooling of
productivity risk, workers are still exposed to employment risk. A
worker with a fixed wage whose productivity declines might not
experience an immediate decline in income, but she is more likely to
lose her job. In this respect, the pooling of productivity risk at the firm

53

Firms might also be able to take steps that reduce the risk of negative productivity shocks
(e.g., on-site flu vaccination clinics).
54
A note to my dean: I of course did not think this when I accepted an assistant professorship
at the University of Chicago Law School.
55
For information on productivity risk pooling at law firms, see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law
Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 (1985).
56
For information on income volatility and its costs for low-income workers, see generally Lily
L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEG. 395 (2003).
57
If amounts received under productivity insurance plans were treated like amounts received
under accident and health plans, then Person B’s premiums would not be tax deductible and
payouts would not be included in gross income. See 26 U.S.C. 105 (2012). The tax consequences
would be the same as if she did not have productivity insurance (i.e., she would face an effective
penalty for income volatility).
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level exposes workers to even more employment risk. Consider that if
wages were to vary with the marginal product of labor, then a worker
whose productivity declined would see her wage decline but her
employer would have no incentive to lay her off. If wages are sticky,
however, employers will have an incentive to fire workers when the
marginal product of the worker’s labor drops below the worker’s wage.58
This last point suggests that if income smoothing is the objective,
pooling of productivity risk at the firm level is not an unmitigated good.
Indeed, it is not entirely clear whether firm-level pooling of productivity
risk leads to more or less income volatility overall: as a result of firmlevel pooling, an individual worker will be exposed to less of an income
shock when she experiences a productivity decline and keeps her job,
but more of an income shock when she experiences a productivity
decline and loses her job. Remember that in the absence of firm-level
pooling, the productivity decline would likely not lead to job loss; it
would instead lead to a decline in compensation. This analysis suggests
that even though the workplace can function as a site of productivity
risk pooling, the workplace is not necessarily the optimal site for such
pooling.
F.

Pools of Pools

Analyzing each of these five risks separately—health risk,
longevity risk, mortality risk, disability risk, and productivity risk—
arguably understates the overall advantage of workplace-based risk
pooling. Workplace-based pooling of multiple risks frees employees
from the burden of shopping for several different types of insurance
policies: within the setting of a large firm, employees can rely on human
resource specialists to guide them through a maze of insurance options.
Not only can this economize on cognitive costs for employees, it can also
lead to administrative cost savings because insurance is procured
through a small number of transactions between employer and insurer
rather than a larger number of transactions involving individual
employees. Workplace-based risk pooling also introduces an element of
“collective bargaining”: not collective bargaining in the traditional sense
between employees and employer, but bargaining between employer
and insurer with the employer acting on employees’ behalf. Employers

58

See Hamish Low et al., Wage Risk and Employment Risk over the Life Cycle, 100 AM. ECON.
REV. 1432, 1433 (2010) (“In a fully competitive labor market with no worker-firm match
heterogeneity and no search costs, the distinction between employment and productivity risk
would be meaningless because unemployment would arise only due to low productivity resulting
in the individual’s market wage being below the reservation wage. Unemployment itself would not
be a source of risk.”).
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procuring insurance on the group market may enjoy bargaining power
advantages unavailable to any individual. So too, the bundling of
insurance policies at the workplace level may mitigate adverse selection
problems insofar as certain cross-subsidies offset each other. For
example, the same worker may be a Hardrock with respect to health
risk but an Eggshell with respect to longevity risk (or vice versa). All of
this is to suggest that when it comes to risk pooling, there may be
economies of scope as well as scale.
III. UNPOOLING IN THE UBER ECONOMY
As emphasized in Part II, workplaces potentially serve as sites for
the pooling of health risk, longevity risk, mortality risk, disability risk,
and productivity risk. None of this pooling occurs, however, among
workers in the so-called “gig economy.”59 The Uber experience offers a
stark illustration. While Uber offers drivers the benefits of flexibility
and autonomy,60 it does not offer health insurance, pension benefits, life
insurance, or disability insurance (although it has partnered with other
providers to make it easier for drivers to enroll in health insurance and
set up an IRA).61 And Uber does little to insure drivers against
productivity risk: a driver’s income can vary dramatically depending on
the number of passengers she picks up, whether “surge pricing” is in
effect,62 the price of gasoline, and a range of other factors.63
But while Uber illustrates the unpooling phenomenon, Uber and
other gig economy platforms play only a small role in unpooling on an
economy-wide basis. Much of what we know about the size of the gig
economy comes from Census Bureau statistics on “nonemployer firms,”
businesses with no paid employees.64 An Uber driver operating as a sole
59

See generally Christina Farr, Who’s Responsible for Your Uber Driver’s Health Coverage?,
NPR (Oct. 11, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/10/11/447157698/who-s-resp
onsible-for-your-uber-driver-s-health-coverage [https://perma.cc/2AUL-5ZJ4].
60
Or so the company claims. See New Survey: Drivers Choose Uber for Its Flexibility and
Convenience, UBER NEWSROOM (Dec. 7, 2015), https://newsroom.uber.com/driver-partner-survey
[https://perma.cc/5M3L-LKG7].
61
See Heather Long, Uber Tests Program To Help Drivers Save for Retirement, CNN MONEY
(Aug. 24, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/24/investing/uber-save-for-retirement-betterment
[https://perma.cc/N6B6-N7CK].
62
On surge pricing, see M. Keith Chen & Michael Sheldon, Dynamic Pricing in a Labor
Market: Surge Pricing and Flexible Work on the Uber Platform (Dec. 21, 2015) (unpublished
paper).
63
On income volatility in the gig economy, see Natasha Singer, In the Sharing Economy,
Workers Find Both Freedom and Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/08/17/technology/in-the-sharing-economy-workers-find-both-freedom-and-uncertainty.h
tml [https://perma.cc/NY9U-8SHM].
64
Ian Hathaway & Mark Muro, Tracking the Gig Economy: New Numbers, BROOKINGS INST.
(Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/tracking-the-gig-economy-new-numbers
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proprietor or through an S corporation or limited liability company
would constitute one nonemployer firm, as would a homeowner who
earns income by renting out spare rooms on Airbnb. The ranks of
nonemployer firms also include, however, many workers outside the gig
economy, ranging from doctors and lawyers in solo practice to hot dog
stand proprietors and private piano teachers.
In 1997, there were 8.3 payroll employees per nonemployer firm in
the United States.65 By 2014, the ratio of payroll employees to
nonemployer firms had fallen to 6.1-to-1. In certain sectors, the change
was more dramatic: for instance, the ratio of payroll employees to
nonemployer firms fell by more than 40% in some segments of the
passenger ground transportation industry. And yet of the 9 million
nonemployer firms that have emerged since 1997, the passenger ground
transportation industry accounts for only about 200,000.66 Uber and
Lyft illustrate the growth of the nonemployer economy, but they hardly
explain that growth on their own.
Unpooling, moreover, is not merely a phenomenon among the selfemployed. Most workers are not enrolled in workplace-based short-term
or long-term disability insurance; almost half are not enrolled in
workplace-based life insurance;67 and only a small sliver are still
enrolled in workplace-based defined benefit pension plans.68 Even at its
peak, defined benefit plans covered less than half of private sector
workers in the United States.69 The promise of workplace-based risk
pooling was never fully realized even in the pre-Uber economy. And so
in analyzing the future of workplace-based risk pooling, it is important

[https://perma.cc/GGT9-GS4K].
65
That does not mean one in every 9.3 workers was self-employed, however, as some workers
were full-time or part-time employees of a multiemployee establishment while operating a
nonemployer firm on the side.
66
Hathaway & Muro, supra note 64. The increase of 200,000 might seem small given that
Uber alone had added more than 160,000 drivers by the end of 2014. See Jonathan V. Hall & Alan
B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States (Jan.
22, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The University of Chicago Legal Forum). Note,
though, that Uber’s rise has come at the same time as a fall in the number of taxi drivers in many
U.S. cities, and the drivers potentially displaced by Uber operated as nonemployer firms as well.
See, e.g., Leonor Vivanco, Number of Chicago Taxi Drivers Hits 10-Year Low as Ride-Share
Companies Take Off, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 17, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicagotaxi-driver-decline-met-20161214-story.html [https://perma.cc/3XW7-2F54].
67
GEN RE, LIFE & HEALTH FACT BOOK, 2015-2016, supra note 46, at 50.
68
See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST, supra note 38.
69
In 1975, approximately 39% of private sector workers in the United States participated in
defined benefit plans. Data for early years is not available, but the total fraction of U.S. private
sector workers participating in any pension plan (defined benefit or not) did not exceed one half
prior to 1975. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FACTS FROM EBRI: U.S. RETIREMENT INCOME
SYSTEM 5 (1998), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/1298fact.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W6VQG8D].
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not to glorify the state of pooling in the past. In theory, workplace-based
risk pooling can mitigate problems of moral hazard and (especially)
adverse selection that plague individual insurance markets; in practice,
workplace-based risk pooling has always left a large segment of the U.S.
population unpooled.
IV. THE FUTURE OF POOLING
So far, this article has highlighted the ways in which workplaces
can serve as sites of risk pooling—and ways in which workplaces
oftentimes do not perform that function. This last part considers the
ways in which risk pooling might continue to occur notwithstanding the
rise of Uber and nonemployer firms more generally.
One possibility is that workers will value pooling so much that
firms like Uber and Lyft—or their competitors—will realize that they
can do better (i.e., can attract more skilled/competent workers and/or
can save by cutting cash compensation) if they establish workplacebased risk pools of their own. The founder of Juno, a ridesharing
platform with nearly 13,000 drivers in New York City as of August
2016, has spoken about making its drivers employees rather than
independent contractors and offering benefits.70 So far, however, Juno’s
most significant moves away from Uber’s compensation model have
come in the form of lower commissions, optional tipping through the
Juno app, and the company’s decision to set aside shares of restricted
stock for drivers.71 Employee stock ownership is a far cry from risk
pooling—indeed, it is the opposite of risk pooling in that leaves
employees even more exposed to the risk that their employer will fail
(because firm failure will then result in the employee losing not only
her job but also her savings).72
An obstacle to workplace-based risk pooling is the fact that most of
the associated tax advantages depend on workers qualifying as
“employees.”73 Although the tax law test for whether a worker is an
70

Aarti Shahani, Uber Competitor In NYC Promises Drivers Benefits, Even Employee Status,
NPR (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/08/22/490655700/ubercompetitor-in-nyc-promises-drivers-benefits-even-employee-status [https://perma.cc/32BE-W94Y].
71
See Claire Martin, Granting Shares for Fares: An Uber Rival’s Play for Drivers, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/technology/granting-shares-for-fares-an-uberrivals-play-for-drivers.html [https://perma.cc/7RXH-3PWS].
72
For a thoughtful discussion of the relationship between employee ownership and risk
bearing, see Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1772–73 (1990).
73
See 26 U.S.C. § 79(a) (2012) (exclusion from “gross income of an employee” for employer-paid
premiums on up to $50,000 of group term life insurance); 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2012) (“gross income
of an employee does not include employer-provided coverage under an accident or health plan”); 26
U.S.C. § 125(d)(1) (2012) (all participants in “cafeteria plan” must be “employees”).
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“employee” is not the same as the test under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA),74 actions that increase the likelihood of a worker being
classified as an employee for income tax purposes might also militate in
favor of employee classification for FLSA purposes (e.g., setting hours
for work; requiring the worker to work full time; paying the worker by
the hour, week, or month).75 Firms may rightly fear that making a
worker an employee for tax purposes will trigger the application of
FLSA’s minimum hourly wage and overtime pay requirements.
Likewise, firms may be concerned that steps toward qualifying workers
as employees for tax purposes will increase tort liability exposure under
the doctrine of respondeat superior.76
Lawmakers might encourage workplace-based risk pooling by
allowing firms to classify workers as employees for federal income tax
purposes without triggering employee classification for FLSA and other
labor law purposes. A firm like Uber, then, would be able to contribute
to drivers’ health insurance and disability insurance, and to offer
drivers life insurance coverage of up to $50,000, without triggering any
inclusion of income for the employee. Note, though, that there are costs
as well as benefits to this approach. Most significantly, any change that
confers tax benefits on Uber drivers will also lead to a loss of revenue
for the fisc. It is not obvious that the risk spreading benefits are worth
the tax dollars that would have to be sacrificed.
Furthermore, while the federal tax system provides benefits for
workplace-based risk pooling among employees, employee status for
Uber drivers and other currently self-employed individuals would come
with tax disadvantages as well. One tax disadvantage of employee
status is the fact that employees who opt for the standard deduction on
their individual income tax returns cannot claim a deduction for
unreimbursed employee business expenses.77 And even for taxpayers
who opt to itemize their deductions, employee status comes with a cost:
unreimbursed business expenses below 2% of adjusted gross income
cannot be deducted on one’s individual income tax return.78 So long as
gig economy workers are paying a large share of business expenses out
74

See Charles J. Muhl, What Is an Employee? The Answer Depends on Federal Law, MONTHLY
LABOR REV. (Jan. 2002), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/01/art1full.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF
X4-5YAA].
75
The IRS has set forth a 20-factor test for whether a worker is an employee or an independent
contractor. See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
76
Cf. Maria Dinzeo, Uber Says It’s Not Liable for Drivers’ Misdeeds, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV.
(Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.courthousenews.com/2016/04/01/uber-says-its-not-liable-for-driversmisdeeds.htm [https://perma.cc/NV6J-5BRZ] (noting Uber’s efforts to escape liability for driver’s
on-the-job conduct).
77
See 26 U.S.C. § 62(a)(1) (2012).
78
26 U.S.C. § 67 (2012).
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of pocket, the pooling-related tax benefits of employee classification
might not be worth the unfavorable treatment of expenses that comes
with it.
Moreover, whether platforms like Uber and Lyft begin to facilitate
workplace-based risk pooling, these pools will still leave out nonemployee workers who are not platform participants: construction
laborers, landscapers, fitness trainers, therapists in solo practice, and
millions of others.79 Organizations such as the Freelancers Union have
sought to pool these “independent workers” to purchase health, life, and
disability insurance, and to enroll in a defined contribution 401(k)
plan.80 But while the Freelancers Union and similar organizations
certainly can play an important role in providing information to
independent workers regarding individual insurance market offerings,
the voluntary association model is unlikely to mitigate the adverse
selection problems endemic to individual insurance markets. If, for
example, the Freelancers Union offers generous life insurance or
disability insurance benefits to members who procure insurance
through the organization, then individuals with high mortality or
disability risks will select into those benefits. It is hard to see how the
voluntary association model might give rise to risk pools that
encompass both high-risk and low-risk individuals.
Probably the most straightforward way to establish pools that
encompass high risk and low risk individuals is for the government to
do so itself. And, indeed, federal programs already play an important
role in pooling health risk, longevity risk, mortality risk, disability risk,
and productivity risk.81 Medicare and Medicaid facilitate the pooling of
health risk among covered individuals (in particular, senior citizens and
low income households). Social Security insures workers against
longevity risk by providing monthly payments from retirement age
until death. Social Security further provides insurance against
mortality risk through a system of survivor benefits, and against
disability risk by providing income supplements for individuals under
retirement age who become unable to work. Meanwhile, a progressive
income tax rate structure, coupled with income security programs such

79

On the size and composition of the self-employed workforce, see Justin Fox, Where Are All
the Self-Employed Workers?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 7, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/02/where-are-allthe-self-employed-workers [https://perma.cc/3Y8G-9MP6].
80
See generally Benefits, FREELANCERS UNION, https://www.freelancersunion.org/benefits/
[https://perma.cc/V8LX-45KT] (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
81
Safety net programs arguably insure against mortality risk as well by dampening the
consumption shock that a spouse, dependent, or child will experience when an income-earning
household member dies prematurely.
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as the Earned Income Tax Credit, buffers households against
consumption shocks when a breadwinner’s productivity declines.82
Yet Social Security was never intended to be the only mechanism
by which workers would insure against longevity risk, mortality risk,
or disability risk.83 Meanwhile, Medicare, Medicaid, and other public
programs provide health insurance to only 36% of the U.S. population.84
And the Earned Income Tax Credit was explicitly designed not to
provide a catch-all safety net for workers edged out of the labor force.85
Asking these programs to serve as substitutes for workplace-based risk
pools is asking them to perform a function for which they are illdesigned.
From the observations above, one might draw out an argument for
the public sector to play the risk pooling role at which gig economy firms
like Uber are failing. It would be a surprise to all, though, if President
Trump and a Republican-led Congress catalyze a change in that
direction. If the public sector’s risk pooling role is to expand in the
second half of the 21st century’s second decade, then that change will
almost certainly have to come from a level of government other than the
federal.
State-level risk pooling is not unprecedented. Massachusetts’s
“Romneycare” experience is perhaps the most prominent recent
example,86 and the Social Security Act of 1935 drew lessons from a more
modest unemployment insurance scheme implemented by the state of
Wisconsin three years earlier.87 A full treatment of state-based risk
pooling lies well beyond the space limits of this article and the scope of
this symposium. The notion that states might serve as sites for broader
risk pooling is, however, a possibility worth exploring in further depth.
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Yet a state-based patchwork of risk pools would no doubt leave
large swaths of America unpooled. State-based risk sharing might be
politically plausible in Oregon or Vermont; it is less so in, say,
Oklahoma or Wyoming. Perhaps Blue States can serve as laboratories
of democracy that demonstrate the plausibility of public-sponsored
pools, just as Wisconsin and Massachusetts did in earlier eras, with the
result that the federal government adopts a similar program
nationwide. But it will take a President and a Congress much more
amenable to new safety net programs before any such scheme is
implemented nationally.
In the meantime, we can expect that workplace-based pooling will
remain the primary mechanism for risk-sharing across high-risk and
low-risk individuals outside the limited confines of Social Security,
Medicare, and Medicaid. Meanwhile, millions of workers without
traditional employers, hundreds of thousands of whom toil in the
growing gig economy, will remain unpooled—unable to insure
themselves against health risk, longevity risk, mortality risk, disability
risk, and productivity risk except through adverse selection-prone
individual insurance markets. What has come to be called the “sharing
economy”88 might be better described as a “go-it-alone economy,” in
which risks are individualized and workers go unpooled. The paradigm
of workplace-based risk pooling might not have been perfectly equipped
for any era, but it seems particularly ill-equipped for the Uber era. As
Uber announces the arrival of a “brave new world,”89 its workers are left
to brave that world by themselves.
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